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When Institutional Work Backfires: Organizational
Control of Professional Work in the
Pharmaceutical Industry

Jagdip Singh and Rama K. Jayanti
Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland State University
ABSTRACT Integrating institutional and role theories, this paper develops a Logics–Roles–
Action (LRA) framework for understanding how for-profit organizations structure institutional
work to managerially control the work of professionals they employ. Structurally, this
institutional work involves three elements: (1) internalizing pluralistic logics (logics); (2)
institutionalizing distinct roles embedded in these logics (roles); and (3) scripting goal-oriented
role enactment plans (action). An empirical examination of the LRA framework in the
pharmaceutical industry evidences four distinct organizational strategies that script role
enactments of sales professionals in their interactions with physicians. Each strategy is intended
to reaffirm prevailing institutional logics, but eventually backfires by disrupting the very
institutional structures that it seeks to maintain and replicate. We show that this disruptive
effect is mediated by changes in the social knowledge of institutional work. We close with
theoretical and managerial implications for organizational structuring of institutional work and
dynamics of institutional change.

Keywords: institutional change, institutional work, logics, organization, pharmaceutical
marketing, professional work, role enactment

INTRODUCTION
Expansion in the employment and control of professionals by for-profit organizations is
an unmistakable characteristic of the modern age (Brint, 1994; Broadbent et al., 1997;
Brock, 2006). Organizations are managing ever-larger swaths of professional work
(Leicht and Fennell, 1997), and there is growing recognition that once employed,
professionals more or less cede their free agent status and submit to organizational
edict for maximizing economic returns (Scott, 2008, p. 220). Suddaby et al. (2009,
p. 424) agree and note that professional work is appropriated by organizations with
‘growing influence of the logic of managerialism in the profession’. Because professionals

are bound by a fiduciary obligation to place client interest above all else, organizational
control of professional work sharpens the focus on the potentially competing logics that
govern employed professionals (Cooper and Robson, 2006; von Nordenflycht, 2010).
How do commercial interests and fiduciary obligations coexist in for-profit organizations? How do such organizations reconcile conflicts? What are the implications of
institutional work that structures and controls professional work? Despite the significance
of and challenges posed by such questions, Scott (2008, p. 220) laments that, while free
professionals have been well studied, scant attention has been paid to ‘institution bound’
professionals whose autonomy is constrained by organizational edict. As a result, little is
known about the nature, strategy, and scope of organizational efforts to structure and
control the work of professionals they employ.
This paper aims to fill the preceding gap in the literature by proposing a Logics–
Roles–Action (LRA) framework for studying organizational control of professional work
that integrates institutional and role theory perspectives. A central assertion of the
proposed framework is that organizations draw from widely available institutional logics
to structure and direct professional roles for desired action and valued outcomes and, in
turn, professional action is interpreted by clients and publics as institutional work with
potential to legitimize, stabilize, disrupt, or innovate prevalent institutional structures
and fields. The conception of roles provides a theoretical bridge for understanding how
organizations situate and scaffold institutional work – that is, exert agency in structuring
the interplay between institutional logics and actions of employed professionals. Barley
and Tolbert (1997, p. 99) recognized that role scripts are critical pivots in understanding
the recursive interdependence between institutions and actions. We build on this foundation by considering how organizations structure these pivots in structuring institutional
work to motivate, direct, and control the professionals they employ.
In so doing, we incorporate the pluralistic institutional logics – communal and commercial – that characterize institution bound professionals employed by for-profit organizations (Dunn and Jones, 2010; Leicht and Fennell, 1997; Scott, 2008; Suddaby et al.,
2009). Consistent with past research (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Dunn and Jones,
2010; Glynn and Lounsbury, 2005), we sharpen the contrast between logics and show
how these contrasting logics constrain and bolster the agency of actors to enact action
routines that stabilize, disrupt, or innovate institutional orders and fields (Sitkin and
Sutcliffe, 1991; Suddaby et al., 2009). However, unlike past research that has considered
actors as individuals or groups, we focus on organizations as actors engaged in institutional work. The reach and reign of organizational agency may be constrained by
professionals’ relative success in wrestling autonomy over decisional rights (Suddaby
et al., 2009). For instance, physicians employed by for-profit hospitals typically enjoy
substantial power and autonomy in work-related decisions, while pharmacists employed
in the same context usually lack similar power or autonomy. More so than the former,
the latter situation is relevant to our theorizing.
We extend past research on action–institution interdependence by identifying conditions
that allow institutional work by organizations to stick, resulting in institutional stability, or
backfire, resulting in institutional change. Several studies have examined the role of institutional work in precipitating institutional change (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Haveman
and Rao, 2006; Rao et al., 2003). Typically, these studies focus on institutional change and

examine its roots in actors’ efforts to situate and scaffold institutional work by ‘translating
exogenous shocks . . . and disruptive events’ or internalizing ‘peripheral positions . . . and
boundary [perspectives]’ (Zietsma and Lawrence, 2010, p. 189). Our study considers an
opposite, heretofore neglected, situation. That is, how institutional work by organizations that
is intended to reinforce institutional logics and bolster institutional stability can nevertheless
precipitate institutional change through mechanisms rooted in social knowledge. In this sense,
we consider how institutional work by organizations may backfire, and conceptualize the role
of social knowledge in precipitating institutional change.
Based on the above arguments, we develop an LRA framework to motivate two
research questions for empirical analysis within the context of pharmaceutical industry
sales professionals:
(1) How do organizations structure institutional work that allows organizational
control of professionals they employ?
(2) How do changes in social knowledge influence interpretations of organizations’
institutional work to precipitate institutional change?
Pharmaceutical sales professionals (PSPs) are well suited to our study aims. A majority of
over 80,000 PSPs in the United States work in for-profit pharmaceutical companies who
are obligated to optimize ROI for their stakeholders (Arnold, 2010). However, PSPs have
been particularly successful in institutionalizing professionalization through: (1) formal
associations that define the distinctive knowledge work that they perform (e.g. American
Association of Pharmaceutical Sales Professionals or AAPSP); (2) accreditation and
certification mechanisms that maintain and enforce standards and provide continuing
education; and (3) explicit code of ethics (Clark et al., 2001).[1] Several federal agencies,
including the states of New Hampshire and Vermont, have certification standards for
PSPs. However, despite professionalization successes, PSPs may be best viewed as emerging professionals, or neo professionals per von Nordenflycht (2010), since they lack power
and autonomy in decision making and are historically dependent on their employers. No
study has examined the organizational control of PSP work or the plurality of logics that
characterizes such professionals. Moreover, while the institutional literature has examined
several classical professions (e.g. physicians, lawyers), emerging professionals in areas
ranging from consulting to customer-facing have been rarely studied.
Our paper is structured as follows. First, we conceptualize an LRA framework that
bridges institutional and role theories. Specifically, we leverage the role theory concepts
of role enactments and interpretations to ground the study’s research questions. Subsequently, we present our research setting, methods for collecting multi-source data, and
analytical procedures used. Thereafter, we outline the results and close with a discussion
that links our results to the literature and identifies directions for future research.
LRA FRAMEWORK
In theorizing the link between institution and action, Barley and Tolbert (1997) drew
from Giddens’ (1976) notion of structuration and Goffman’s (1983) conception of
interaction to posit that scripts are ‘tools’ for structuring action that reflect the general
principles of an institutional logic, just as speech (actions) draws from principles of

Figure 1. The Logics–Roles–Action (LRA) framework for organizational structuring of institutional work
and its institutional change implications

grammar (institutions). We build on this foundation by proposing that scripts, conceived
in the context of role theory, are instruments that organizations use to structure and
institutionalize specific roles that serve as useful conduits of institutional work for bureaucratic control of professional work. This approach is consistent with institutional theorists
who propose logics as common meaning systems that structure organizations in a
particular field by providing frames for decision making (Caronna, 2004; Scott, 2001,
p. 57; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Although original conceptions of logics adhered to
isomorphism by theorizing a single dominant logic for organizational fields, institution
bound professionals bring a plurality of logics to their organizational roles. How exactly
these pluralistic logics are played out in everyday professional work, and how organizations manage professional work to achieve desired outcomes is the focus of our theoretical contribution.
Figure 1 depicts our theoretical framework that intersects three conceptual themes: (a)
institutional foundations for communal and commercial logics that organizations internalize to control professional work (LOGICS); (b) institutionalization of consultant and
closer roles that correspond to communal and commercial logics respectively (ROLES);
and (c) strategies and tactics for directing professional work in accord with scripted role
enactment plans that address the tension of pluralistic logics (ACTION). Also depicted in
Figure 1 are role interpretations that clients attribute to professionals’ role enactments.

Table I. The Logics–Roles–Action framework: terminology and definitions
Role
Constructs

Closer

Consultant

Definition

Professionals are expected to use their
expertise to counter customer
objections, use persuasive influence
tactics and give priority to closing
the deal with maximal monetary
gains
‘Commercial ’: meaning systems that
emphasize business values of
rationality, instrumentality, and
monetary gains (Haveman et al.,
2007)
Agents use their expertise to counter
customer objections, give priority to
closing the ‘sale’ with maximal
monetary gains to the organization,
and use persuasive influence tactics
Achieve or exceed sales targets and
maximize organizational return on
profitability
Socialization, monitoring, and
compensation
Professional is categorized
unambiguously by observers and
clients as a commercial agent
motivated by financial gain
A coherent set of interpretable data
about others’ intentions, desires, and
beliefs that individuals are motivated
to acquire, process, and store in
order to successfully navigate social
interactions and facilitate social
category judgments

Professionals are expected to use their
expertise to understand and solve
customer problems, give priority to
customer needs, and act with
restrained opportunism

Related institutional
logic

Role enactment:
norms and
expectations

Role enactment:
performance goals
Role enactment:
control instruments
Role interpretation

Social knowledge

‘Communal ’: meaning systems that
emphasize social trusteeship values
of expertise, morality, and
benevolence (Abbott, 1988;
Haveman and Rao, 1997)
Agents use their expertise to
understand and solve customer
problems, give priority to customer
needs, and act with restrained
opportunism
Build long term relationships with
target customers, and maximize
customer satisfaction
Socialization, monitoring, and
compensation
Professional is categorized
unambiguously by observers and
clients as a consultative agent
motivated by serving client interests
A coherent set of interpretable data
about others’ intentions, desires, and
beliefs that individuals are motivated
to acquire, process, and store in
order to successfully navigate social
interactions and facilitate social
category judgments

Our framework posits that clients draw on their social knowledge to infer role interpretations permitting them to deviate from those intended by organizational role scripts and,
when they do, incongruent role interpretations result. The framework identifies conditions under which clients’ incongruent role interpretations disrupt the structures that
legitimize the link between logics and roles, thereby problematizing organizational
agency in institutional work. To aid development of the preceding themes, we summarize the key terminology and definitions in Table I, where roles are the organizing
concepts with PSPs as the illustrative context. Nevertheless, the underlying ideas have
broader application to institutional work in for-profit organizations.

Plurality of Institutional Logics in Professional Work
Institutional logics are ‘axial systems of meaning’ for structuring social order and action
(Dunn and Jones, 2010; Friedland and Alford, 1991; Suddaby, 2010, p. 16; Thornton
and Ocasio, 2008). As per Thornton and Ocasio (1999), institutions, through their
structural, normative and symbolic properties, support the production and reproduction
of socially constructed and commonly shared beliefs and values that constitute its logics.
In turn, logics act as shared templates for individual action that are rooted in deeply held,
often unchallenged assumptions and beliefs (Barley and Kunda, 1992), that originate in
societal institutions such as family and professions (Dunn and Jones, 2010). Thus, the
concept of institutional logics refers to a meta-theory that focuses on the mechanisms that
link individual roles (agency) at the micro-level and institutionalized practices and rule
structures (meaning systems) at the macro-level.
Interdependent and contradictory logics are a feature of institutional fields where
pluralistic logics with distinct meaning systems often conflict with each other by imposing
inconsistent expectations (Nigam and Ocasio, 2010). Such pluralistic logics are pervasive
in several industries ranging from publishing (market and craft logics; Thornton, 2002)
to thrifts (moral and progressive logics; Haveman and Rao, 1997). We propose that
institutional work in modern for-profit organizations is similarly characterized by a
plurality of commercial and communal logics. We conceptualize commercial logics as
meaning systems that emphasize business values consistent with shareholder responsibility including rationality, instrumentality, and monetary gains (Haveman et al., 2007);
while communal logics are meaning systems that emphasize social trusteeship values
consistent with fiduciary responsibility including expertise, morality, and benevolence
(Abbott, 1988; Haveman and Rao, 1997). The roots of commercial and communal logics
can be traced to Weber’s (1978) formal and substantive rationality respectively. As per
Weber, formal rationality involves decisions emphasizing cost–benefit calculations,
whereas substantive rationality emphasizes principled values. Today, both logics are
meaningful and legitimate values of a larger institutional field characteristic of a capitalist
society inspired by organized activities for ethical and principled pursuit of profits (Davis
et al., 1997).
Tensions between pluralistic logics are often not benign and become especially problematic when individuals or organizations are beholden to fiduciary responsibility as in
the case of professionals. Such tensions have been studied in the evolution of thrift
industry as a negotiation between communal and progressive ideals (Haveman and Rao,
1997; Haveman et al., 2007), in the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra as the contestation
between the sacred and profane market logics (Glynn and Lounsbury, 2005), in the
mutual fund industry as a competition between trusteeship and performance logics
(Lounsbury, 2007), and in microfinance organizations as a challenge between the
banking and development logics (Battilana and Dorado, 2010). Additionally, tension
between communal and commercial logics have been studied by entrepreneurship (Blatt,
2009; communal/contracting schemas) and marketing scholars (Aggarwal and Law,
2005; communal/exchange norms).
Past research suggests that the temporal unfolding of the tension between the pluralistic logics in organizational settings may evidence at least three modal patterns. First,

taking a macro perspective, studies emphasize an inherent incompatibility between
logics such that a competitive pattern is evident where one of the logics eventually
wins, forcing the field to coalesce around a new dominant logic (Greenwood and
Suddaby, 2006; Lounsbury, 2002; Nigam and Ocasio, 2010; Rao et al., 2003; Thornton,
2002).
Second, adopting a micro perspective, studies emphasize modalities of mutual coexistence of pluralistic logics such that organizational actors creatively draw upon or shift
between identities rooted in the different logics to suit their interests and inclinations
(Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Dunn and Jones, 2010; Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007;
Purdy and Gray, 2009). For instance, Jones and Livne-Tarandach (2008) document
architects’ rhetorical strategies where architects creatively draw on keywords and
vocabularies of multiple logics, while Meyer and Hammerschmid (2006) illuminate
how actors creatively translate global logics into local versions and in the process
deliberately manipulate competing logics to their advantage (Suddaby and
Greenwood, 2005). In a similar vein, Cooper et al. (1996) show how emergent managerial logics overlay on pre-existing professional logics in law firms allowing actors to
construct varying interpretive schemas which in turn promote organizational
change.
Third, adopting an organizational perspective, studies emphasize patterns of structured
coordination such that the pluralistic logics coexist like the second perspective but
organizational agency is highlighted in structuring coordinating mechanisms for navigating
the latent conflict of pluralistic logics (Glynn, 2008; Kraatz and Block, 2008; Lounsbury,
2007; Pratt and Kraatz, 2009; Reay and Hinings, 2009). This perspective parallels the
professionalism as a ‘resource’ view in the sociology of professions literature (Alvesson
and Johansson, 2002). As per this view, managers internalize professionalism ‘from
above’ to gain external legitimacy while asserting internal authority to motivate, direct,
and regulate professionals to achieve organizational objectives (Evetts, 2011, p. 408).
This body of work points to the growth of organized systems that intricately weave
commercial practices and professional priorities, and to organizations as increasingly the
primary agent of control over professional work (Brock, 2006; Faulconbridge and Muzio,
2008; Kipping, 2011).
Building on the third perspective, the LRA framework proposes that organizations
actively internalize the conflicting features of pluralistic logics by institutionalizing roles
to act as instruments for directing professional action to serve organizational goals.
Specifically, the LRA framework views for-profit organizations as active and creative
arbiters of pluralistic logics that define professional work rather than as reactive institutions burdened to cope with the conflict that professionals bring to their commercial
logics. Our internalization argument is distinct from sedimentation which draws on the
geological metaphor of one institutional logic layered on top of another (Cooper et al.,
1996). Active internalization of pluralistic logics asserts and assures the coexistence of
both logics, and focuses attention on structures for using this pluralism as a resource to
scaffold goal-directed action. Pharmaceutical companies exemplify this active internalization of pluralistic logics. Company mission statements emphasize commercial goals
while concurrently highlighting pursuit of communal goals. For instance, the Novartis
company mission statement states:

We want to discover, develop and successfully market innovative products to prevent and
cure diseases, to ease suffering and to enhance the quality of life. We also want to
provide a shareholder return that reflects outstanding performance and to adequately
reward those who invest ideas and work in our company. (Novartis, 2012; emphasis in
original)
The two statements in the mission statement above align closely with the communal and
commercial logics, respectively. Such pluralistic emphasis is common among leading,
publicly held pharmaceutical companies. Internalization of pluralistic logics allows
organizations to structure mechanisms for managing professional work by institutionalization of roles, which we address next.
Institutionalization of Roles for Organizational Control of
Professional Work
Role theory proposes roles to be a relatively unique cluster of expectations and norms
that are typically diagnostic of a particular socially defined category. Behavioural routines that provide recipes for action in order to conform to a social category are referred
to as role scripts (Stryker and Statham, 1985). Although they did not refer to role theory,
Barley and Tolbert (1997, p. 98) assert that institutions are enacted by [role] scripts,
which they defined as ‘observable, recurrent activities and patterns of interaction [that
are] characteristic of a particular setting’.
Consistent with Barley and Tolbert, we posit that organizations structure norms,
expectations, and goals (Ryals and Davies, 2010; Weitz and Bradford, 1999) associated
with two distinct roles – closer and consultant – that reaffirm and reproduce the institutional routines of commercial and communal logics respectively. The institutionalization process involves setting norms, expectations, and goals as part of organizational
structures (e.g. job descriptions) and controls (e.g. socialization, monitoring). In a closer
role, organizational agents are expected to use their expertise to counter customer
objections, use persuasive influence tactics, and give priority to closing the deal with
maximal monetary gains (see Table I). For instance, in the case of the pharmaceutical
industry, PSPs are socialized into closer role scripts that include detailing (e.g. presentations to physicians to promote company products) and sampling practices (e.g. inducing trial through free samples). Consistent with closer role expectations, organizations set
performance goals that focus the agents’ attention on sales targets, profitability, and/or
return on investment.
In a consultant role, organizational agents are expected to use their expertise to
understand and solve customer problems, give priority to customer needs, and act with
restrained opportunism (see Table I). For instance, organizations may direct PSPs to
enact a consultant role by updating physicians with current research even if the results
are unfavourable for the company’s drugs, and provide customized information to
physicians based on their attitudes towards prescribing (Elling et al., 2002). Moreover, to
focus and direct PSP action towards a consultant role, organizations may set related
performance goals that include building long-term relationships and maximizing client
(physician) satisfaction.

To ensure that employed professionals enact organizationally arbitrated roles, firms
typically use socialization, training, and compensation as mechanisms of role control
(Anderson and Oliver, 1987). Socialization and training promote process control by
facilitating adoption and assimilation of organizationally mediated norms, expectations,
and goals. For instance, Greene (2004) suggests that training and socialization programmes condition PSPs to internalize a closer persona even while enacting professionally intensive exchanges with physicians. Such conditioning is replete with artefacts and
scripts including interaction etiquette, dress code, grooming, use of language, and even
how they should hold their pens, while showing scientific materials to physicians (Greene,
2004). Firms utilize compensation plans for outcome control to protect them from moral
hazard of autonomous agents. For instance, to support a closer role, a significant portion
of PSP compensation, ranging from 25 to 40 per cent, is linked to achievement of sales
targets, with additional incentives used to motivate PSPs’ efforts towards sales goals
(Arnold, 2010). Likewise, to ensure compliance of employed professionals with a consultant role, organizations tie PSP bonus and incentives to client satisfaction, and rely on
process controls that focus on quality of PSP interactions with clients. Together, closer
and communal roles are powerful instruments for embedding action at the micro-level in
deeply rooted logics at the macro-level (e.g. institutional).
Action as Professional Role Enactment
A significant challenge for organizations is to control professional role enactments or
actions that mitigate the potential conflict in the plurality of consultant and closer roles.
Conflict may surface because upholding communal interests often is at odds with maximizing commercial gains. When contradictory roles are enacted, role interpretations are
likely to be confounded, blurred, miscoded, or misinterpreted.[2]
Organizational success is vested in professional action that cues unambiguous interpretations among its clients and minimizes errors of miscoding role enactments. For
instance, when a PSP is directed to provide a physician with recent medical knowledge
that is not particularly favourable towards the company’s products, the organizational
goal is to cue physicians to a consultant role and unambiguously rule out a closer role,
thereby clarifying the social category enacted. For this reason, employed professionals
are rarely left to devise their own role enactments. Rather, role enactment is a strategic
prerogative for most organizations. Organizations use past experiences, exemplars (e.g.
highly successful employees), research (e.g. persuasion), and feedback (e.g. from clients)
to strategize role enactment plans for employed professionals which are often fine-tuned
and updated as more knowledge is gained from the field (Greene, 2004). Such scripting
of role enactment usually includes an overall strategic objective and specific tactics for
engaging observers (e.g. clients) to generate the intended role interpretations.
Through concepts such as role switching, separation, incorporation, and suppression,
role theory provides a framework for conceiving role enactments to navigate the conflicted action implications of pluralistic roles (Ashforth, 2001; Settles et al., 2002). Role
switching involves organizational strategies and tactics for carefully scripting the points of
transition for switching from consultant to closer role enactments within an exchange
encounter and vice versa so that clients are cued by switches to avoid ambiguous role

interpretations (Ashforth, 2001). Role separation, by contrast, involves temporally separating consultant and closer role enactments (or vice versa). That is, in any given
continuous interaction with the client, employed professionals are directed to enact a
singular role routine resulting in unambiguous role interpretations. Role incorporation is
an organizational strategy that acknowledges the tension between roles and uses it to
develop scripts for innovative enactments that integrate both roles (Settles et al., 2002).
Finally, role suppression involves a strategy wherein employed professionals are scripted
to purposely enact role routines that not only emphasize a particular role but also negate
the potentially conflicted role. An example noted earlier involving PSPs purposely
providing credible information to physicians that may be detrimental to commercial
interest illustrates a script that strategically directs PSPs to enact a consultant role while
suppressing inferences related to a closer role.
In summary, the LRA framework posits that organizations institutionalize roles corresponding to the internalized logics and script role enactments to use them as instruments for directing professional action in the service of organizational goals. Because
organizations situate roles within widely accepted logics of their institutional fields, and
scaffold the roles to enact goal-oriented action, we refer to such organizational efforts as
institutional work. No empirical study to date has explored or examined how organizations in practice situate and scaffold roles to control professional work.
Research Question 1: How do organizations structure institutional work that allows
organizational control of professionals they employ?

Social Knowledge and Institutional Change Dynamics
Intended roles in professional enactments are rarely isomorphic with roles interpreted by
clients. As noted, organizations structure role enactments as institutional work to induce
inferences of a particular role category (e.g. consultant). Role interpretations are clients’
actual categorization of actors’ role enactments based not only on the displayed cues but
also on underlying motivations that are inferred usually via attributional processes
(Howard, 1985). These attributional processes engage clients’ social knowledge (to be
discussed) and information about the situation that goes beyond the cues from specific
role enactment (see Table I). Thus, a consultant role enactment that cues deliberate
suppression of commercial interest may be inferred as a closer role instead if the client
has social knowledge indicating that the employed professional’s motivations are suspect
or untrustworthy. When this occurs, clients are likely to reject the intentional cues
encoded in role enactments.
The organizational imperative is to minimize gaps between role enactments and role
interpretations. Gaps are minimized when role enactments are rooted in scripts that are
drawn from widely shared institutional logics and display behavioural and nonbehavioural cues for unambiguous role interpretations. Thus, organizations deliberately
leverage logics that are clearly understood and deeply grounded in the larger institutional
field to script role enactments that reproduce and reaffirm these logics. Directing professional work to constitute a new institutional order or experiment with role enactments

injects uncertainty in goal pursuit (e.g. ambiguous inferences) and risks effectiveness (e.g.
profitability).
Despite the wilful and strenuous efforts of organizations, intended role enactments and
role interpretations diverge. We posit that clients’ social knowledge is relevant for
understanding whether intended role enactments and interpretations will converge or
diverge. Rooted in the theory of mind (Perner, 1999; Premack and Woodruff, 1978) or
folk psychology (Lillard, 1997), social knowledge is defined as a coherent set of interpretable data about others’ intentions, desires, and beliefs that individuals are motivated
to acquire, process, and store in order to successfully navigate social interactions and
facilitate social category judgments (Frith and Frith, 2012; Lillard, 1997). Individuals
construct such knowledge through attributional processes of reasoning, categorizing, and
learning (Bruner, 1990; Wellman, 1993) as they observe and reflect on social interactions
as well as learn from others’ knowledge of social interactions (Arrow, 1994). Viewing role
enactments as social interactions, we posit that clients are motivated to acquire social
knowledge to categorize professional role (e.g. consultant or closer) and to facilitate
interpretation using information gleaned during the interaction (e.g. accept or reject). To
the extent that clients are professionally organized to share and construct collective
knowledge (e.g. physicians in the American Medical Association), they are likely to
construct their social knowledge more so on the widely shared collective beliefs than on
directly cued information in individual interactions with professionals. Moreover,
because client (e.g. physician) interactions with the pharmaceutical industry are of broad
public (e.g. patient) interest, the ebbs and flows of discourse on industry practices in
publicly available media (e.g. newspapers, TV, magazines) also shape the emergent social
knowledge shared among clients. In a sense, social knowledge is continuously recalibrated, refined and, if needed, revised as clients engage in collective processes to share
and construct this knowledge based on their myriad individual experiences and informed
by the unfolding discourse in the public media. Because clients’ social knowledge is
constructed largely outside organizational influence and for this reason more useful in
interpreting clients’ individual interactions with PSPs, cues from specific role enactments
by professionals hold relatively less sway on clients’ social knowledge or in evoking
desired role categories.
Specifically, clients’ social knowledge that confirms the authenticity of role enactments
(i.e. role congruency) will likely bolster clients’ confidence in interpreting and categorizing role cues to minimize gaps. By contrast, social knowledge that contradicts the
authenticity of role enactments (i.e. role incongruency) will likely disconfirm clients’
(earlier) role interpretations and prompt reinterpretation and re-categorization to widen
gaps. Institutional change is triggered when reinterpretations and re-categorizations
become widely shared and gaps become irreconcilable.
We posit that institutional work by organizations structured through role enactments
of PSPs may, under role incongruent conditions, precipitate unintentional institutional
change. Lawrence et al. (2009, p. 11) note that institutional work may fail to affect
intended change, or might disrupt institutional structures in ways that are ‘very different
from those originally conceived by the [organizations] involved’. Employed professionals
may unwittingly enact roles as naïve institutional agents without fully grasping the
institutional effects of their collective actions (Scott, 2008). Although past research has

discussed such possibilities (Kraatz and Block, 2008), no study to our knowledge has
examined conditions that mediate the relationship between the institutional work and
changes in institutional structures. We posit that widespread shifts in social knowledge
are a relevant factor in precipitating change in institutional structures.
Research Question 2: How do changes in social knowledge influence interpretations of
organizations’ institutional work to precipitate institutional change?

STUDY DESIGN
We used a case-based design involving in-depth, interpretive analysis of organizational
strategies and tactics utilized to control professional work (as per Research Question 1).
In addition, we tracked and analysed public documents to assess changes in social
knowledge and its influence in shifting clients’ role interpretations and precipitating
institutional change (as per Research Question 2). The specific case selected allowed
access to materials that illuminate an organization’s strategy-in-action consistent with the
practice approach to institutions ( Jarzabkowski et al., 2009). A practice approach, as
advocated by Kraatz and Block (2008) and Jarzabkowski et al. (2009): (a) focuses attention on the everyday actions of actors, thereby emphasizing role enactments; (b) studies
actions from a praxis lens, thereby embedding action within institutional logics; and (c)
acknowledges the tensions of institutional pluralism, thereby attending to navigation of
pluralistic logics. Below, we outline the: (1) case study selection; (2) coding and categorizing of organizational strategies and tactics; and (3) tracking and analysing changes in
social knowledge and institutional structures.

Selection of Case Study
In order to explore the research questions, we required unfettered access to internal
organizational documents and senior management personnel to understand strategies
and tactics used in practice to control professional work. However, these materials are
proprietary data that are rarely accessible. A source of reliable and valid data is discovery
documents generated during the pre-trial (discovery) phase in a lawsuit in which each
party assembles evidence for litigation by requesting and acquiring pertinent documents
and other relevant information, including access to executives (e.g. for deposition). The
laws governing public access to court records provide detailed, authenticated, and
otherwise proprietary data for review and analysis. Court records are a rich source of
data as they include authenticated internal organizational documents, sworn testimonies,
accounting and billing statements, reports from consultants and suppliers, and other
related materials. Often sworn testimonies probe the thinking underlying actions, just as
records of strategy meetings outline the rationale and goals underlying proposed initiatives. However, court documents do not constitute a complete record of either the
motivations behind organizational strategies, or actions that could have been observed.
Nevertheless, court documents are relatively superior to other practical approaches in
terms of the quality and quantity of obtained data. Increasingly, recent research has used

court documents to obtain insights into pharmaceutical marketing practices (Healy and
Cattell, 2003; Psaty and Kronmal, 2008; Ross et al., 2008).
To identify an appropriate case study, we examined six major litigation cases adjudicated since 2003 that involved PSPs employed in the pharmaceutical industry. We
preferred a case that: (1) provided rich content and relatively comprehensive coverage of
organizational strategies and tactics for managing professional work; (2) involved a major
drug (e.g. blockbuster) of a leading pharmaceutical company (e.g. Fortune 500) so that
the obtained insights would reflect industry practices; and (3) offered high degree of
accessibility such that most, if not all, of the relevant discovery documents could be
obtained for original analysis. Based on these considerations, we selected United States of
America ex. rel David Franklin vs. Pfizer Inc, and Parke-Davis, Division of Warner-Lambert Company.
The case involved marketing practices related to Neurontin® (chemically known as
gabapentin). The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) initially approved Neurontin in 1993 for adjunctive treatment of partial complex seizures in adults older than
12 years in age and for dosages not exceeding 1200 mg/day. By the mid-1990s, Neurontin experienced its highest growth as treatment for off-label uses of pain syndromes
(e.g. neuropathic pain) and psychiatric disorders (e.g. bipolar disorders). Off-label uses
involved uses not specified in the labelling approved by the FDA but approved by a
licensed physician on the strength of medical judgment. At its peak, Neurontin was
marketed in over 100 countries, used by over 12 million patients, and was generating
annual revenue of over $2.7 billion. The case was settled on 13 May 2004, and Pfizer was
directed to pay $430 million in settlement fees and make fundamental changes to its
marketing practices for violating the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
Coding and Categorizing Organizational Strategies and Tactics
The court documents were obtained by the researchers directly from the attorneys, and
supplemented by digital archival documents from the University of California, San
Francisco website (http://dida.library.ucsf.edu). We had access to over 5,000 pages of
court discovery documents. Two teams, each involving a lead researcher and a student,
were constituted. Both teams worked independently to comb the materials to extract the
key strategies and tactics for managing PSP work, and met subsequently to resolve
differences and integrate extracted strategies and tactics. Tactics were grouped under
strategies based on team judgments, and between team correspondence initially focused
on strategies and then moved on to tactics. Discovery documents and supplementary
exhibits were treated as textual data to be interpreted through a series of part to whole
iterations involving distinct stages of intra- (within strategies, placing focus on tactics) and
inter-strategy analysis (between strategies, placing focus on objectives). Moreover, we
followed an iterative process by challenging emergent concepts from inter-strategy analysis through another round of intra-strategy analysis, and refining the concepts through a
return to inter-strategy analysis. During each step, emergent concepts were reviewed for
consistency with the definition of consultant and closer roles. Triangulation across the
teams ensured that marginal and less relevant role concepts were ruled out. The results
were tabulated for each strategy and a table developed to display strategy–tactics
linkages.

Tracking and Analysing Changes in Social Knowledge and
Institutional Structures
We recognize that causal basis of change is difficult to establish in a case study and
alternative explanations are hard to rule out. As such, we do not claim to provide
irrefutable evidence of causality between institutional work and institutional change.
Rather, our analytical approach provides initial insight into institutional changes that
may be traced to institutional work rooted in organizational strategies and tactics.
We tracked and analysed changes in social knowledge related to organizational strategies and tactics as represented in public and medical materials (e.g. publications, journals). Three data sources were utilized to assess changes in social knowledge: (1) public
disclosures involving PSP work following the court case; (2) public disclosures of similar
strategies and tactics by other organizations in the industry; and (3) reports of strategies
and tactics by pharmaceutical companies in leading medical journals, by searching the
PubMed database from the US National Library of Medicine (i.e. Journal of the American
Medical Association and New England Journal of Medicine). We reviewed articles published
subsequent to the court settlement (13 May 2004) in the popular press such as New York
Times, Wall Street Journal, and National Public Radio.
Finally, we tracked and analysed changes in institutional structures related to PSP
work practices. Specifically, we tracked public materials as noted above but analysed
them with a focus on: (1) physician interpretations of PSP role and/or changes in
practices governing physician–PSP interactions; (2) regulatory changes influencing PSP
actions related to strategies and tactics identified above; and (3) changing public perceptions of the PSP role that can be traced to the specific strategies and tactics identified,
and/or the court case discussed.
For both analyses, we followed an approach similar to that used for the first research
question with two teams independently analysing materials and meeting subsequently to
identify convergent results and discuss divergences. The results were summarized as a
narrative and institutional changes linked to individual strategies identified as per our
focus.
FINDINGS
Research Question 1: Strategies and Tactics as Scripted Role Enactments
Our analysis identified four distinct strategies, each with a coherent set of tactics, to script
role enactment of sales professionals: (1) evidence-based strategy related to production of
scientific evidence and its dissemination by sales professionals; (2) medical education
strategy related to continuing education of physicians about emergent standards of
medical care and its facilitation by sales professionals; (3) surrogate selling strategy related
to sales professionals’ recruitment of physicians for peer-to-peer selling; and (4) market
penetration strategy related to sales professionals’ efforts to identify and target physicians
who offer high-return from prescriptions. Table II summarizes the objectives established
for each strategy, as well as the specific tactics used to implement each strategy. Verbatim
comments are included from internal documents and sworn testimonies. References to
specific exhibits are provided in the text, but not individually listed in the bibliography to

Marketing tactics
Clinical trial programme to financially support
research studies and publish them sequentially in
reputable journals to promote a ‘life cycle planning’
of Neurontin® market performance (exhibit 72,
57).
‘MES (Medical Education Systems Inc.) will work
with medical faculty (chosen at the discretion of
Parke-Davis) to draft approximately twelve scientific
articles on the topic of AED therapy, budgeted
$160,500 in grant money for these articles. (exhibit
65, 66).
Promotional campaign using detailing, direct mail,
and journal advertising to promote the use of
Neurontin® earlier and titration at higher doses
(exhibit 39).
‘Unrestricted’ educational grant to medical education
companies to prepare programmes accredited by
ACCME with Parke-Davis representatives shaping
the content and following attendance counts to
support a ‘growth opportunity’ in off-label uses
(1997 situation analysis). Educational seminars and
teleconferences to increase Neurontin® new
prescriptions (exhibit 79)
Recruit physicians qualified as high prescribers of
AIDs by providing incentives to entice
participation. (exhibit 76).
‘Make influencers aware of availability of research
opportunities in clinical trials.’
‘Emerging thought leaders will be paired with existing
thought leaders to meet others supportive of
Parke-Davis and its products.’ (exhibit 45)
Disease-based Advisory Boards (e.g. AIDS
Neuropathy, Child Neurology, Migraine).
Target centres of influence based on (1) availability of
neurology, geriatric, psychiatric, cardiology and
internal medicine programmes, (2) number of
residencies and fellowships, and (3) outpatient visit
volume. (exhibit 34, phase I).
PPS (professional Postgraduate Services) developed a
Home Study Programme (HSP) supervised by
Parke-Davis representatives to be distributed to
about 10,000 target physicians in April 1996
(exhibit 51).
Decile 10 physicians broken by specialty for precision
marketing (exhibit 35).

Strategy (% budget)

Evidence-based strategy (53.6%)
Marketing objectives:
• Execute publications, educational activities, and
promotional plan to expand Neurontin®
monotherapy usage.
• To seed the idea in physicians’ minds that
Neurontin® can and should be used earlier in the
treatment armamentarium. (verbatim from 1998
Situation Analysis Report; Exhibit 57).
• To increase the titration level of Neurontin® dosage
(1200 mg/day to 1800 mg/day) (exhibit 39).

Medical education strategy (27.8%)
Marketing objectives:
• To develop or support educational programmes
consistent with Parke-Davis’s marketing programme
• To increase Neurontin new prescriptions by
educating non-prescribers to begin prescribing and
current prescribers to increase prescription
behaviour.

‘Surrogate selling’ strategy (1l.9%)
Marketing objectives:
• Maximize relationship with key epileptologists to
expand Neurontin usage with residents/fellows,
office based neurologists and selected PCPs.
• Use peer influence to give non-users reassurance of
Neurontin®’s efficacy and tolerability.
• Gain 100% access for Neurontin®.

Market penetration strategy (6.6%)
Marketing objectives:
• Increase the accessibility of the Parke-Davis
portfolio to all major teaching institutions
• An epilepsy and pain educational programme that
is targeted at (1) neurology specialists including
general neurologists and neurosurgeons, and (2)
primary care physicians whose practice includes a
significant number of patients with epilepsy or
chronic pain (exhibit 51).

Neurometrix is under investigation by HHS for
targeting general practitioners for an automated
device, NC-stat, that checks patients for nerve
disease. The company allegedly instituted a
‘customer referral programme’ in which physicians
receive credits for steering other doctors to
Neurometrix. (Abelson NYT, 10/20/06)
Urorad Healthcare aggressively targets urologists for
marketing IMRT (intensely modulated radiation
therapy), a procedure for radiation therapy in
patients with prostate cancer. (Saul, 12/01/06
NYT)

Dr Gleason was arrested for promoting Xyrem for off
label uses at ‘hundreds of speeches and seminars.’
Dr Gleason acknowledged receiving more than
$100,000 from Jazz Pharmaceuticals (Xyrem
maker), including $450 to visit a doctor’s office,
$750 for luncheon speech, $1,500 for dinner
speech, and making ‘as much as $3,000 a day.’
(Berenson, 07/22/2006, NYT)

Cephalon funded doctors’ participation in seminars at
which paid speakers promoted off-label uses.
Carreyrou, 11/21/06, WSJ, B1).

Physicians recruited by sleeping pill manufacturers to
publish articles in professional journals that raise
concerns or undermine performance of a
competing generic drug – Trazodone – which is
considerably cheaper than manufacturer branded
drugs such as Lunesta and Ambien (Carlat NYT,
05/09/2006, A27).
Mathews (2005) reports widespread practice of ‘ghost
writing’ research articles for publication in medical
journals that are written by professional writers,
authored by physicians and funded by
pharmaceutical companies at the cost of ‘$30,000
per article or more.’

Industry examples

Table II. A summary of organizational strategies and tactics as scripted role enactments

Role incorporation: Professionals positioned
their sales pitch to resonate with
physicians’ goal to maximize patient
welfare thus simultaneously pursuing both
closer and consultant roles.

Role suppression: Professionals organize and
facilitate peer-to-peer events by inviting
thought leaders and practicing physicians
to discuss emergent practice trends and
developments, without playing any direct
role in discussions. Both consultant and
closer roles are suppressed to yield centre
stage to physicians to communicate as
peers.

Role suppression: Professionals facilitate
educational programmes by sponsoring
CME events, informing physicians, and
distributing educational materials.
Consultant role highlighted, and closer
role is suppressed.

Role suppression: Professionals disseminate
published research consistent with
evidence based medical practice.
Consultant role emphasized, closer role
suppressed.

Role enactment plan

avoid repetitive reference to the same source. Table II also includes industry examples
indicating the corresponding strategy’s prevalence in the industry.
Evidence-based strategy. As noted in Table II, evidence-based strategy had three objectives:
(a) to expand Neurontin monotherapy usage (exhibit 77);[3] (b) to encourage Neurontin
use earlier in the treatment regime; and (c) to increase the titration level by 50 per cent
from 1200 mg/day to 1800 mg/day. Internal documents state that the evidence-based
strategy was motivated by commercial goals to increase sales (exhibit 21), and return on
investment estimates were explicitly calculated to target disease indications with the
greatest revenue potential. Parke-Davis estimated that the evidence-based strategy could
generate $204 million a year in off-label sales before the patent expired (exhibit 29).
In general, the tactics involved a coordinated programme of targeted research studies
for sequential publication in peer-reviewed journals (exhibits 72, 77, 57). This included:
(a) covert activities including engaging outside commercial companies; and (b) overt
activities that directed PSP to disseminate the evidence generated from covert activities.
For instance, PSPs covertly invited key physicians to participate in clinical trials to
investigate the efficacy of Neurontin under different conditions (e.g. higher titration,
early use). The participating physicians released the data from funded clinical trials to
contract companies for statistical analysis and manuscript development. Internal documents show that Parke-Davis contracted with Medical Education Systems Inc. (MES) to
draft and facilitate publication of 12 articles with a budget of $165,000 in peer-reviewed
journals. MES invited each participating physician to be a co-author or a lead author on
the publication, a practice that became known as guest- or ghost-authorship (Ross et al.,
2008). Typically, the published articles did not disclose the company’s involvement in
generating and publishing the evidence.
Once the articles were published, PSPs’ role enactments involved overt activities that
disseminated the published work broadly to physicians. Not being privy to the commercial intent in evidence generation, physicians were probably cued to a consultant role by
PSPs’ interest in providing evidence-based medical knowledge, while negating any intent
to ‘close’ sales for their drugs. Thus, this strategy is consistent with a role suppression
enactment plan.
Medical education strategy. The company conceived the medical education strategy with
two aims: (1) to develop and support educational programmes that discuss unapproved
uses of Neurontin, and allow continuing medical education (CME) credits to participating physicians; and (2) to increase Neurontin new prescriptions by educating nonprescribers to begin prescribing and current prescribers to increase prescription
behaviour (exhibit 34). The company allocated 27.8 per cent of its marketing budget to
this strategy (second row, Table II).
Tactics associated with this strategy included unrestricted educational grants to
medical education companies (exhibit 79). Technically, unrestricted grants required
Parke-Davis to relinquish control over programme speakers and content to allow continuing medical education credit to participating physicians (as per the Accreditation
Council of Continuing Medical Education or ACCME). Although Parke-Davis indicated
compliance with ACCME guidelines, internal documents show that sales professionals

provided input to conference content, suggested speakers, and tracked participating
physicians’ pre- and post-seminar prescribing behaviour to examine the commercial
effectiveness of educational grants (exhibit 79). The PSPs’ role included identifying
physicians for participation in speakers’ bureau, and facilitating sponsored educational
events. In some instances, Parke-Davis paid physicians to attend seminars, act as part of
the audience, and plant leading questions intended to portray Neurontin in a positive
light (e.g. $200 honorarium, exhibit 79).
Tactics associated with the medical education strategy were generally not transparent
to participating physicians, even those who were paid by Parke-Davis. Without full
knowledge of Parke-Davis’s strategy and tactics, participating physicians likely viewed
PSP role enactments as motivated mainly by supporting the dissemination of emergent
medical knowledge, and facilitating earning of CME credits. Most physicians had no
knowledge that their prescription behaviour was tracked following participation in an
educational programme to estimate commercial payoffs. Thus, consistent with a role
suppression plan, physicians’ role interpretations cued a consultant role by PSPs’ facilitation of physicians’ continuing education with little interest in extracting commercial
benefits per the closer role.
Surrogate selling strategy. As noted in Table II, this strategy had three objectives: (a) build
and harvest relationships with key epileptologists to expand Neurontin usage and penetration (exhibit 45); (b) rely on peer influence to assure non-users about Neurontin’s
efficacy and tolerability; and (c) gain 100 per cent access for Neurontin. This strategy
relied on physicians as surrogates for PSPs to sell Neurontin to their peers.
In particular, the tactics focused on building a network of key epileptologists called
‘Neurontin® Champions’ who can be influential in promoting Neurontin use. Sales
professionals identified, recruited, and where necessary, enticed thought leaders from
large teaching hospitals to join an exclusive group of Neurontin champions. Court
documents revealed that the enrolled Neurontin champions participated in speakers’
bureau and physician-to-physician interactions ostensibly to promote Neurontin (exhibits 25, 26, 28, 38). PSPs were encouraged to ‘expand the speaker base – identify and train
strong Neurontin advocates and users to speak locally for Neurontin’ (exhibit 19). To
engage and compensate Neurontin champions for their time and effort, financial awards
were provided in the form of direct payments, research grants, and/or support (exhibits
34, 61, 72). The company also organized disease-based advisory boards for discussing
diagnostic criteria and appropriate treatment plans for specific diseases (e.g. neuropathy,
migraine).
The premise of surrogate selling is that physicians neither attribute commercial intent
to recommendations from trusted peers, nor do they suspect company complicity in the
professional bonds among physicians. Both the Neurontin Champions and the company
refrained from disclosing the associated financial awards, ensuring that surrogate selling
was perceived as peer-to-peer communication untainted by company or commercial
interest and, with PSPs remaining in the background, suppressed PSPs closer and
consultant roles.
Market penetration strategy. This strategy aimed to penetrate the market for Neurontin by
identifying and targeting ‘high-value’ physicians located in major teaching hospitals (see

last row, Table II). For instance, Parke-Davis targeted neurology specialists and primary
care physicians who have access to a significant number of patients suffering from
chronic pain, and act as key gatekeepers for facilitating Neurontin use among patients.
In addition, by focusing on major teaching hospitals, this strategy targeted physicians
who had significant influence on practices adopted by other hospitals.
Tactically, sales professionals categorized physicians based on their potential for
writing prescriptions for Neurontin into deciles, and identified the physicians in the top
deciles for targeting (e.g. market potential of 10th decile physicians estimated at
$309,517, exhibit 35). Several tactics were devised to guide PSP role enactments for
effective targeting. Specifically, for over 10,000 targeted physicians, PSPs facilitated a
Home Study Programme that included focus on pain management. PSPs recruited and
encouraged targeted physicians to join the programme. Parke-Davis invited senior PSPs
to participate as observers in psychiatry teleconferences organized through a third party
vendor (exhibit 37). Parke-Davis followed prescribing habits of targeted physicians, and
directed PSPs to implement a retention programme for high-valued prescribers with
expensive vacations and gifts.
Although the sales professionals were explicitly directed to enact a closer role in
physician interactions, market penetration strategy incorporated a consultant role within
a closer role. Instead of pushing drugs through a sales pitch, Parke-Davis directed PSPs
to engage physicians by emphasizing advancements in pain management for patients
suffering from epilepsy or other neurological conditions associated with chronic pain.
Consistent with a consultant role, sales professionals were encouraged to gain expertise
in pain management therapies and were called ‘medical liaison officers’ to signal that
they are dedicated to providing medical information rather than promoting drugs. Thus,
Parke-Davis apparently utilized a role incorporation strategy by concurrently emphasizing the closer and the consultant role.

Research Question 2: Managed Professional Work and
Institutional Change
Changes in social knowledge. The selected case was unique in many respects. It represented:
(a) one of the largest settlements for a federal case not involving the Department of
Justice; (b) expanded jurisdiction of the False Claims Act to include marketing claims as
criminal violations of federal and state laws; (c) revelations of complicity of several
renowned physicians; and (d) evidence of substantial adulteration of medical literature
by articles generated by undisclosed consultants retained by pharmaceutical companies
(Steinman et al., 2006). The whistleblower in the case, David Franklin, was a medical
liaison officer in the company and played an active role in public dissemination of
industry marketing practices (Angell, 2005). The significant settlement amounts, $240
million criminal fine plus $152 million payments to healthcare programmes, drew
widespread attention.
As a result, the Neurontin case entered and shifted the social discourse on pharmaceutical marketing and roles PSPs play in physician interactions. The outrage at scripted
PSP role enactments was so pervasive and compelling that it resulted in several dedicated

Wikipedia pages, a CBS ‘60 minutes’ feature story, wide coverage in popular TV
programmes such as MSNBC, and an unprecedented interest among leading media such
as Business Week, Newsweek, and PBS Front line.
Changes to social knowledge were bolstered by a series of reports confirming similar
practices by other pharmaceutical companies, suggesting that these practices were not
unusual but business as usual. Table II summarizes several reports that we culled from
our analysis (see column 3). For instance, Mathews (2005) reported that guest- (or
ghost)-writing to support evidence-based strategy was a widespread industry practice,
and Carlat (2006) documented a concerted orchestration of publications by sleeping pill
manufacturers to undermine generic substitutes. Likewise, in a detailed contribution to
New York Times (titled Side Effects from a movie released in 2005), Berenson (2006) used the
public arrest of Dr Peter Gleason, a well known Maryland psychiatrist for promoting
Xyrem, to document the common industry practice of retaining leading practitioners
with significant payments for surrogate selling. Several reports appeared subsequently to
substantiate the funding of physicians to gain their participation in educational seminars
with promotional intent (Carreyrou, 2006), and elaborate targeting programmes that
provided credits to physicians for referring and steering other physicians towards companies’ drugs (Abelson, 2006).
The diffusion of the preceding reports and analyses was accelerated by a number of
social network sites. For instance, ProPublica, an independent, non-profit newsroom,
collaborated with NPR, the Boston Globe, the Chicago Tribune, PBS Nightly Business Report,
and Consumer Reports to systematically investigate and report how pharmaceutical
company payments to physicians influence prescription practices. The publicity generated whetted the public’s appetite for more thorough accounts of the pharmaceutical
industry’s influence on physician decisions. Several books were published to fill this need
(Angell, 2005; Murray, 2010; Petersen, 2008), and turned up the heat on the organizational dilution of professional standards to promote commercial interests.
Overall, the change in social knowledge of pharmaceutical strategies and tactics
triggered by the Neurontin case was so significant and profound that some scholars refer
to it as the ‘Neurontin legacy’ (Landefeld and Steinman, 2009). Likewise, critical studies
of ethics in pharmaceutical sales and the controversial role of PSPs are often dated by the
Neurontin case (Datamonitor, 2006). Subsequent cases with significant settlement
amounts involving Merck (2004, Vioxx), GlaxoSmithKline (2008, Paxil), and Eli Lilly
(2009, Zyprexa) further solidified the emergent social knowledge.
Changes in institutional structures. Our analysis reveals significant changes in the normative,
regulative, and cognitive institutional structures governing PSP–physician interactions
that can be traced to the changes in the social knowledge. For instance, in response to
widespread disclosure of evidence-based strategy, the Journal of the American Medical
Association, along with the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors revised its
norms and procedures requiring all authors to include an explicit disclosure of conflicts
of interest and, for industry sponsored research, to confirm independent statistical analysis as a condition for publication (Flanagin et al., 2006). Similarly, disclosures of medical
education strategy prompted PhRMA, the trade group representing the pharmaceutical
research and manufacturers of America, to revise its codes of conduct to prohibit

industry involvement in CME programmes through educational grants. Likewise,
several academic physician associations came out with new guidelines that prohibited
pharmaceutical industry sponsorship of CME programmes.
In response to surrogate selling strategy, five states[4] and the District of Columbia
enacted laws that mandated pharmaceutical companies to file broad and unrestricted
disclosure of payments to individual physicians, allowing such physicians to be publicly
identified. Eleven additional states have proposed similar legislation. Prompted by legislative action and doubts about their authenticity, some companies now provide
public access to their financial disclosure report (e.g. pfizer.com/responsibility/), enabling patients to search for payments received by individual physicians. Prosecutors
have successfully evoked anti-kickback statute and the False Claims Act to prosecute
cases involving financial arrangements between physicians and pharmaceutical
companies.
Finally, the market penetration strategy prompted stringent federal regulatory oversight including the recent Physician Payments Sunshine provisions in healthcare reform
legislation. These provisions require drug and medical device manufacturers to publicly
report gifts and payments made to physicians.[5] In addition, the American Medical
Association code of conduct discourages doctors from accepting gifts from PSPs, and
limits the total annual value of gifts to $100. Wisconsin, Vermont, and Massachusetts
have enacted laws against gift giving to physicians. Since the industry’s market penetration efforts are rooted in tracking prescription data of individual physicians, the American Medical Association created the Prescribing Data Restriction Program to curb
industry use of prescription writing data. Interested physicians can request that their
prescribing data be withheld from pharmaceutical companies. Going still further, academic medical centres including Yale, Harvard, Duke, Stanford, University of Pennsylvania, Henry Ford Health System, and UCLA have banned physicians from receiving
monetary or non-monetary gifts, and expressly prohibited PSPs from patient care areas
(Croasdale, 2006).
DISCUSSION
In the spirit of Barley and Tolbert’s (1997) conception that linking action and institutions
allows understanding institutionalization as a dynamic, interdependent process, this
study theorizes linkages among institutional logics, structured role scripts and professional action – the LRA framework – that makes three contributions to past research: (1)
integrate institutional and role theories to understand how organizations structure institutional work to manage professional work; (2) examine the organizational strategies and
tactics scripted as complex role enactment plans that constitute institutional work; (3)
examine the evolution of clients’ social knowledge that precipitates changes in institutional structures that is unintended by organizations’ institutional work. Past research has
examined organizational control of professional work in the traditions of structured
coordination and professionalism as resource perspectives. Our study advances these
perspectives by providing a rich and novel framework that intersects the concepts of
pluralistic logics from institutional theory with pivots of role enactments from role theory
to theorize how organizations structure institutional work. Suddaby et al. (2009) alluded

to ‘a possible linkage between shifts in values, logics and institutional change’ (p. 425) in
their study on accounting professionals but did not examine these linkages empirically.
To our knowledge, this is the first study that unravels the practice of employed professionals’ work and shows how shifts in social knowledge provoke unintended institutional
change. Empirically, a unique dataset comprising of discovery documents in a recent
court case helped us peel the layers of organizational secrecy to map with sufficient detail
the nuanced and complex role routines that constitute managed professional work.
Finally, going beyond most past studies, our study provides insights into the consequences of organizational efforts to structure professional work and the unintended
institutional change it can provoke. We discuss the key contributions and implications
below and close with limitations and future research directions.
The LRA Framework of Organizational Control of Professional Work
Several aspects of the proposed LRA framework underscore its usefulness in understanding organizational control of professional work. First, our perspective is that of a forprofit organization that holds agency in structuring institutional work that motivates,
controls, and directs the professionals they employ for goal-directed action. Our thesis is
that for-profit organizations that employ professionals for client engagement (e.g. banks,
hospitals, consulting firms, pharmaceutical companies) can neither escape the plurality of
their institutional fields nor legitimize their operations by subordinating or ignoring one
of the logics. Creative institutional work that views professionalism as a resource rather
than a restraint involves active internalization of the pluralistic logics by organizations.
Second, the proposed framework posits that organizations institutionalize distinct roles
corresponding to the pluralistic logics to ensure their translation into action via scripted
role enactments. Roles then are scaffolds for institutionalizing norms, expectations, goals,
and control systems that direct professionals’ role enactments to align with the internalized logics. Third, our framework recognizes that pluralistic logics pose problems for
institutional work due to the potential for contradictory role enactments. As such, we
theorize that organizations control professional work by arbitrating role enactments that
represent carefully scripted strategies and tactics for navigating the competing demands
of pluralistic logics. Specifically, organizations script role enactments to evoke particular
role interpretations among clients that legitimize organizational conformity with widely
available institutional logics. Finally, we theorize that clients do not rely solely on cues
from role enactments of professionals to infer role interpretations. Rather, clients interpret role enactments in the context of social knowledge they construct from community
processes for collective understanding of the organizational motivations and goals underlying professional–client interactions. We specify conditions that induce gaps between
scripted role enactments and role interpretations. In sum, the integration of institutional
and role theories in the LRA framework offers a rich foundation to study the dynamics
of institutional work that organizations structure to control professional work, and opens
avenues for its further development and theorizing.
Dunn and Jones (2010, p. 139), among other institutional researchers, have noted that
institutional fields with pluralistic logics are dynamic that move ‘through periods of
balance and imbalance . . . [creating] an uneasy tension that is not easily resolved’. Our

theorizing extends these ideas to include the dynamic interplay between commercial and
communal logics in the larger institutional field, and its implications for organizational
scripting of role enactments. Potentially in periods where commercial or communal
logics dominate, organizational strategies for role enactments may be less complex and
more transparent compared to periods where both logics reign in importance. What
determines whether a particular logic will dominate or both logics will coexist?
Greenwood et al. (2002) discuss the role of professional associations, which is particularly
relevant. Most professionals organize around associations, just as commercial organizations participate in their own industry trade associations and interest groups. The
organizational arbitrage of professional work occurs in the larger institutional field where
corresponding professional associations contest to wrestle more autonomy for their
constituents.
In drawing boundaries for our theory, we focused on contexts where professional
autonomy is constrained and organizations hold asymmetric arbitrage power. This
should not be assumed to mean that professionals are powerless even in these contexts.
For instance, Sitkin and Sutcliffe (1991) found that pharmacists employed in the same
organization displayed variability in information giving – those who individually adopted
a commercial stance were less likely to provide information, while those who maintained
a professional stance were prone to provide information. This suggests that professionals
as individuals or as collectives can assert agency in deviating from organizationally
scripted role enactments or contesting for alternative enactments. Future theorizing of
our framework can benefit by enlarging it to include the perspectives of employed
professionals and conceptualizing the internal contests for navigating the pluralistic
logics.
Scripted Role Enactments: Simple Displays, Complex Strategies
Our findings provide empirical evidence of proactive exploitation of the wide repertoire
of response templates available from internalizing the pluralistic logics to creatively
weave diverse role enactment scripts. Specifically, we found that organizational strategies involved role scripting in two different domains – a public domain where role
enactments are staged for display in physician interactions, and a private domain carefully shrouded from clients where role enactments fulfil the commercial interests of the
organization. We identified four carefully developed strategies, each with elaborate
tactics for achieving specific objectives. For each strategy and its associated tactics, role
enactments were scripted to display role suppression where a closer role was suppressed
and a consultant role was highlighted (evidence and education strategy), suppression of
both the consultant and closer roles (surrogate strategy), and role incorporation (penetration strategy).
Two insights emerge from these findings. First, the organizational strategies and tactics
uncovered generally evidenced preference for publicly displaying communal over commercial logics in professionals’ role enactments. For instance, in the evidence-based strategy,
displayed role enactments emphasized a consultant role while negating a closer role by
supporting and disseminating ‘untainted’ scientific evidence. Likewise, in the surrogate
selling strategy, displayed role enactment was intended for professionals to take a back seat

by relinquishing both the consultant and closer roles while allowing physicians to take
centre stage in sharing their experiences as peers. Wilful and careful scripting of role
enactments to display active suppression of commercial intent was probably intended to
ensure that physicians’ interpretations were unambiguously categorized into a consultant
role. Even where a role incorporation strategy was used (market penetration), role
enactments were cleverly scripted to bring the consultant role to the fore while pushing the
closer role to the background. Clearly, the organization calculus figured that a consultant
role is more persuasive and compelling for physicians to categorize the professional work
in a positive light and motivate favourable prescription writing.
Second, like the proverbial iceberg, the simplicity of displayed role enactments hid the
underlying complexity of private role enactment plans that craftily interweaved the two
roles. For instance, in the evidence strategy, professionals participated in producing
scientific evidence favourable to the company’s drugs while concealing the complicit role
of the organization in its creation. The omission makes an unequivocal closer role look
like an authentic consultant role. Likewise, in the surrogate selling strategy, crucial
information that peers were carefully selected to act as Champions was purposely
omitted, as was the financial reward provided to the Champions for their surrogate
selling. These omissions obfuscated an unquestionable closer role by projecting a voluntary consultant in peer-to-peer interactions. By deliberately concealing the role complexity from public display, the organization’s strategy for resolving conflict centred on
directing professionals’ displayed role enactments with contrived and complex plans for a
closer masquerade as a consultant.
We conjecture that the role separation and switching are less preferable strategies
because while separation increases client interaction costs (i.e. separate professionals for
consultant and closer roles), role switching increases training and management costs by
requiring complex public role displays that risk confounding role interpretations (i.e. hire,
train, and manage professionals capable of effortlessly shifting between roles). Organizational choice in our study instead centred on complex strategies that required simple
role displays.
In a recent study examining deceptive sales practices in a large financial service firm,
MacLean and Behnam (2010, p. 1500) noted that organizations ‘resolve the tension’ of
conflicted logics by ‘deploying formal structures that meet institutional demands but are
disconnected from actual practice’ (see also Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991). By
contrast, Battilana and Dorado (2010, p. 1420) examine how commercial microfinance
organizations ‘deal internally with institutional pluralism’ by developing hybrid structures that ‘strike a balance between the logics’ (see also Reay and Hinings, 2009). The
organization in our study shows a variation on these themes by internalizing instead of
decoupling communal and commercial logics and crafting a creative and intricate
balancing of the pluralistic logics to develop hybrid role enactment plans (actual, not
displayed). However, like in MacLean and Behnam’s (2010) study, the organization
apparently legitimizes its practices by ostensibly decoupling its consultant role enactments from closer role enactments so that only the former are visible to its clients.
Decoupling in MacLean and Behnam’s (2010) study eventually hollows out the organization’s legitimacy claim by institutionalizing misconduct as its salespeople exploit the
disregard for compliance.

Our study suggests alternative possibilities. Potentially, professionals may reject
organizational control of their professional work because they find it disingenuous.
Evidence of PSPs blowing the whistle on their organizations, writing books that deride
the strategies and tactics of the organizations that hire them (Reidy, 2005), and providing
material for popular movies satirizing their hollow roles (e.g. Side Effects) indicates that
PSPs find their professional cage oppressive and are attempting to assert their power to
reclaim agency. Specifically, in the case we studied, the revelations of organizational
strategies and the legal action that followed was prompted by a prominent professional
who blew the whistle on practices he evidently found incongruent with professional
norms. In other situations (e.g. accountants), employed professionals have attempted to
stunt the power of organizations by evoking professional logics to preserve their
autonomy (Scott, 2008). Evidently, PSPs have been less successful possibly because their
professionalization is too nascent to thwart the power of organizations (von
Nordenflycht, 2010). PSPs may also lack political astuteness to negotiate a space of
autonomous agency in the organizations that employ them to shape their role enactments. Our study invites these possibilities as fruitful topics for future research.
Clients’ Social Knowledge as a Harbinger of Unintentional
Institutional Change
We find that institutional work by the organization we studied ultimately prompted
widespread disruption of the very institutional structures that the organization intended
to maintain and replicate. Evolving social knowledge and growing gaps between role
interpretations and displayed role enactments seeded the forces of institutional change.
Our study suggests that clients’ role interpretations rely on social knowledge that is
largely insulated from organizational influence. Social encoding of role enactments by
clients evolves with changing social knowledge as shifts in public discourse surface new
knowledge.
Institutional change is imminent when changes in social knowledge are so pervasive
and profound that observers discard or deride previous encodings and reinterpret role
enactments with fresh frames of social knowledge. These shifts are amplified by unrelenting evidence of organizational malfeasance from aggressive legal action and widespread and persistent reporting by news media. At some tipping point, public knowledge
of organizational malfeasance may be so amplified that it evokes stigmatization through
a shared consensus to disassociate, discredit, devalue, and attribute illegitimacy to an
entity (Kurzban and Leary, 2001). Possibly, a similar pattern unfolded in our case
study where the evidence of role incongruency took hold and prompted widespread
re-categorization of institutional work by pharmaceutical organizations, reversing the
significant gains in their legitimacy and provoking broad institutional change.
Our framework does not predict that disruption is inevitable and organizational
pursuit of commercial interests is doomed. Only that inflexible and inauthentic role
scripting in client interactions motivated by unfettered profit seeking makes organizations more not less susceptible to client (and public) backlash. Whether this backlash
amplifies or abates depends on externalities that are outside organizational control, as
exemplified by our study. While we have no direct evidence, we conjecture that authentic

public displays of roles that recognize and not repress the underlying logics (e.g. role
separation and role switching) may be more conducive to preventing client and public
backlashes, and abating the effects of role incongruency when and if it arises in client
interactions.
Our study contributes to the literature on institutional change processes by considering institutional work in the larger context of social interactions with organizational
clients. Like previous studies of institutional change, we situate organizational legitimacy
in external stakeholders (Kraatz and Block, 2008; Suchman, 1995). For instance, Reay
and Hinings (2009) examine how change is legitimized as actors compete and collaborate
around conflicting logics. Likewise, noting that ‘understanding how institutional change
occurs is a central challenge to institutionalist accounts’, Greenwood et al. (2002, p. 76)
show how professional associations legitimize change by a process of ‘theorization’ that
includes the use of language, symbols, and artefacts. We extend these efforts by introducing the concepts of clients’ social knowledge and role interpretations as mediators of
institutional work and institutional change relationship. As role theoretic concepts that
capture micro foundational aspects of organization–client interactions, social knowledge
and role interpretations are rich constructs that can illuminate when and why an
organization’s well crafted strategy for gaining external legitimacy by reaffirming institutional logics backfires.
Moreover, our study argues for a systems perspective on institutional work by
completing the loop that goes from logics to action (via roles) and then back
from action to logics (via role interpretations and social knowledge). While the two
parts of the loop respond to different mechanisms and forces, they together constitute
an interdependent system. Physicians depend on pharmaceutical companies to develop
innovative treatments and therapies that empower them to heal and improve the
quality of life of their patients. Pharmaceutical companies depend on physicians
for collaboration to develop and prescribe new treatments and therapies that promote
patient health while offering economic returns. In such interdependent systems,
internal setbacks or failures at any one node reverberate throughout the system
(March and Olsen, 1998). Our LRA framework draws attention to these interdependencies. Like the proverbial trap of digging deeper to find a way out, our study suggests
that the more the professional work narrowed its displays on communal logic to
win physician and public legitimacy, the more profound the likely institutional
change when the strategic cover is unveiled. Unable to grasp this system view,
organizations inadvertently disrupt the very institutional structures that they seek
to maintain and replicate. Future studies are likely to yield incomplete analysis
and misleading insights unless they adopt a systems perspective. Our LRA framework
provides a theoretically sound and pragmatically useful starting point for such
studies.
Study Limitations
Because this study is based on interpretive analysis of a case study, the results are useful
for insights into theoretical mechanisms rather than for generalizable patterns of practice. The reported mechanisms are best viewed as explanations that fit the puzzle rather

than as irrefutable proof of proposed effects. Although our unique case study data
uncovers pieces of puzzle that are usually shrouded or suppressed from scrutiny, we
encourage future research that provides robust evidence of proposed mechanisms.
In addition, the data used in the study do not include first-hand accounts from actors.
Verbatim reports in legal testimonies of key actors are included in the study, but direct
interviews for the purposes of this study are not. Several concerns made such attempts
unattractive, including access to key actors who have since moved on, and the potential
for recovery and reporting biases due to the high level of publicity that followed court
settlement and subsequent disclosures. To this extent, our results infer intentionality but
do not confirm it.
Notably, our study examines the institutional dynamics related to professional work in
the pharmaceutical industry over a period stretching from 2003 to 2010. Institutional
change unfolds as a slow motion process. Patterns observed over a seven-year period may
be open to alternative interpretations when framed in a perspective with longer spans.
Are for-profit organizations inevitably doomed by a fatal dance of commercial and
communal logics in scripted roles for professional work? Or is there a Solomonistic path
to navigate successfully through the competing logics without forsaking one for the other?
Are some industries and organizations, like the pharmaceutical company examined in
this study, especially susceptible to these dilemmas? Indeed, one purpose of our analysis
is to encourage managers in for-profit organizations to be imaginative and creative in
developing paths for successful navigation of competing logics, as it is to highlight the
perils along the path. Nevertheless, more research is needed to examine these questions
in other contexts and across wider swaths of time to obtain comprehensive accounts of
institutional dynamics.
In closing, we note that our study holds broader relevance to managed professional
work in fields as diverse as health care and engineering. We hope that our study provides
the impetus for future research that offers managerial insights to effectively navigate the
competing logics by collaborating with professionals to design institutional work for
sustainable organizational return and legitimacy.

NOTES
[1] A PSP’s distinctive knowledge involves three interrelated domains: (1) Clinical and Medical Knowledge (e.g.
Anatomy, Clinical Pharmacology, Pharmacokinetics, Package Insert Information, Clinical Trials, Toxicology); (2) Regulatory Environment (e.g. laws enforced by the FDA, Compliance in Drug Labelling and
Promotion, Patent law); and (3) Selling Skills (e.g. Relationship Selling, Territory Planning, Drug Logistics
and Transportation, Brand Management).
[2] In the literature, role interpretations by clients or observers who attend to cues in the professional’s role
enactments to infer the corresponding, socially coded, role category displayed are referred to as
‘correspondent inferences’ (Howard, 1985; Jones and Davis, 1965). Our framework posits that clients’
correspondent inferences engage their social knowledge and are not wholly dependent on organizational
orchestration of professional role enactments.
[3] Referred exhibits pertain to materials included in the court documents related to United States ex rel. David
Franklin vs. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp.2d 39 and are available at http://dida.library.ucsf.edu.
[4] The five states are Minnesota, California, Maine, Vermont, and West Virginia.
[5] The Physician Payment Sunshine provisions were included in the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2009 (H.R. 3590, section 6002) which was signed into law on 23 March 2010.
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